On June 17, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and the Directorate General for Human Rights and the Rule of Law (DGI) presented two joint opinions on amendments to Moldovan legislation related to the external evaluation of judges and prosecutors, integrity checks, and the formation of evaluation commissions.
The experts acknowledged the need to build trust in the judicial system but warned of the risks of conflating routine performance evaluations of judges with the extraordinary vetting procedure, and called for stronger procedural safeguards for those being evaluated.
Necessity and Proportionality
The external evaluation of judicial officials is one of the key elements of judicial reform in Moldova. The mechanism was established amid a deep crisis of trust in judicial institutions and became part of the country’s commitments within the framework of the European integration process, the report notes.
The purpose of vetting is to verify whether judges and prosecutors meet the requirements of integrity, professional ethics, and financial transparency.
Moldova had previously sought an expert assessment of the relevant legislation from the Venice Commission. The new opinions were prepared at the request of the Ministry of Justice and address two areas:
– changes related to the verification of financial integrity and the evaluation of district court judges;
– amendments to Laws No. 65/2023 and No. 252/2023, which regulate the appointment of members of the external evaluation commissions for judges and prosecutors.
The Commission’s main conclusion: enhanced vetting should remain an exceptional procedure
One of the central issues in Conclusion CDL-AD(2026)013 was the proposal to temporarily involve an external evaluation commission (EC No. 2) in the financial integrity vetting of district court judges.
The Venice Commission noted that, formally, this involves a change to the standard evaluation procedure; however, in substance, the mechanism effectively amounts to vetting.
Paragraph 49 of the opinion states: “the model proposed by the authorities is integrity vetting in practice.” In other words, according to the experts’ assessment, the proposed model “in practice constitutes an integrity vetting.”
The Commission explained that this involves extending the type of review characteristic of external vetting to a category of judges that was not originally included in this system.
However, the experts did not state that the very purpose of the reform is unfounded.
Paragraph 50 notes: “The Commission and DGI do not rule out that valid reasons for such a measure may exist.”
The Venice Commission acknowledges that there may be legitimate grounds for expanded vetting, but considers it necessary to demonstrate its necessity and proportionality.
What the experts saw as a problem
The main observation concerns the conflation of two different procedures.
According to the Venice Commission, the routine evaluation of judges’ performance and the extraordinary integrity review have different objectives.
The conclusion notes that an enhanced retrospective financial review by an external body based on vetting standards “is inconsistent with the purpose and framework of performance evaluation.”
In other words, it is inconsistent with the very nature of the routine evaluation of judges’ professional performance.
The Commission recommends either retaining a full-fledged vetting model with all its safeguards or modifying the proposed system so that it does not create a double standard.
Why the Commission Demanded More Safeguards for Judges
One of the most serious concerns centered on procedural safeguards.
In paragraph 40 of its opinion, the Venice Commission warns that judges may face the same consequences as under the vetting process—including possible removal from office—but through a procedure with fewer safeguards.
The experts noted: “Judges subject to the procedure set out in the draft law face the same substantive scrutiny and potentially the same ultimate consequence (removal from office) but through a legal pathway that is both procedurally thinner and statutorily less certain.”
In other words, the Commission considers it risky to have a situation where the consequences are comparable to those of vetting, but procedural safeguards are weaker.
In this regard, the Commission recommends that the Moldovan authorities:
– explicitly enshrine the procedural safeguards provided for in Law No. 252/2023;
– ensure the right to present evidence;
– guarantee the right to be heard;
– ensure effective avenues for appealing decisions.
Unclear Consequences of a Negative Assessment
Another issue concerns what exactly happens after a negative integrity assessment.
In paragraph 38, the Commission recommends: “clearly set out the consequences of a negative integrity assessment”
In other words, the legislation must clearly define the consequences of a negative assessment.
According to experts, the regulations must comply with the following principles:
– legal certainty;
– due process;
– proportionality.
The Venice Commission paid particular attention to the role of EC No. 2.
Experts consider it necessary to clarify that its opinion is advisory and not automatically binding on other bodies.
Paragraph 51 of the recommendations states that the EC No. 2 report must be:
– open to full analysis;
– subject to independent assessment by the High Council of the Magistracy (HCMA);
– not replace the evaluating body’s own decision.
The Commission also pointed out the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of evaluation bodies to analyze such materials.
The reform timeline raises questions
Another issue concerns practical implementation.
In paragraph 42 of the conclusion, the experts note that some participants in the process consider the proposed timelines unrealistic given the scope of the work.
The Venice Commission recommends:
– maintain the temporary nature of the mechanism;
– ensure sufficient administrative resources;
– prevent the temporary procedure from becoming permanent.
A separate issue is the procedure for appointing commission members
The second opinion—CDL-AD(2026)014—concerns amendments to Laws No. 65/2023 and No. 252/2023.
The main issue here relates to the mechanism for appointing international commission members.
The Venice Commission noted that the amendments were introduced at a late stage of the legislative process.
Paragraph 19 states that the change to the voting procedure was introduced only during the second reading.
The Commission also highlighted the concern expressed by consultation participants that the opposition and civil society may not have had sufficient opportunity to present their positions.
The experts warned that rushing legislation through without thorough debate could lead to lower-quality laws and a decline in trust in institutions.
What the Venice Commission Recommends
The main recommendations for reform can be summarized in several areas:
– clearly define the legal nature of the review;
– Do not confuse routine evaluations of judges with extraordinary vetting;
– ensure full procedural safeguards;
– Define the consequences of a negative evaluation;
– guarantee an independent review of decisions;
– eliminate repeated reviews by the same judges;
– ensure that the mechanism is temporary;
– improve the consultation process when enacting legislation.
Conclusions and Implications
Although the Venice Commission’s conclusions directly concern the judicial system, their implications extend beyond the legal sphere.
For businesses, the quality of judicial institutions is linked to:
– protection of property;
– contract enforcement;
– the resolution of commercial disputes;
– assessment of investment risks.
A predictable judicial system is one of the factors influencing companies’ willingness to invest and expand their operations in the country.
The Venice Commission did not question the need for judicial reform in Moldova or for higher standards of integrity among judges.
However, Council of Europe experts believe that the chosen mechanisms must be brought into line with the principles of legal certainty, proportionality, and judicial independence.
The key message of the findings is the need to maintain a balance: the fight against corruption risks must not create new risks to the independence of the judicial system.
