Vasile Tofan
The agenda for yesterday’s meeting included three items. The first and most important was the mechanism for the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products via Moldova’s railways. The second was the licensing by an authorized Moldovan government agency of imports (not transit) into the country from Ukraine of a specific list of “sensitive” agri-food products (in this case, grains, oilseeds, and certain products derived from them). The third was VAT reform for agri-food products.
The discussion, as acknowledged by both sides, turned out to be “sticky and tense—at times heated.” As a result, after nearly two hours of debate, the dialogue had made no progress on the third issue. Meanwhile, the status of the “main problem” shifted from the first issue to the second.
No one is against Ukrainian transit, but…
First and foremost, it is worth noting that none of the parties to the dialogue initially expressed a desire to shut down the “solidarity corridor” with Ukraine.
Of course, Moldovan agribusiness operators understood that the less Ukrainian grain and oilseeds (as well as products derived from them) end up in the European Union and third countries, the higher the prices will be in those markets for Moldovan, Romanian, Bulgarian (and, in general, alternative to Ukrainian and Russian) agricultural products from the Black Sea region would be sold on the markets of those countries.
But while some farmers’ organizations in Poland and Romania did not hesitate to speak openly about this, Moldovan agricultural producers and traders considered it a win-win strategy to “bet” on the lack of transparency and economic justification in the government decision-making process that ensures the operation of the “solidarity corridor” with Ukraine.
In particular, the decision to allow the transit of Ukrainian cargo via Moldova’s railways at a 50 percent discount looked, from the perspective of Moldovan business operators, like a 100 percent provocation. And they fell for it.
Arguments and calculations appeared in the Moldovan media that government officials characterized as manipulative and misleading. Although, to be fair, what kind of “misinformation” could there have been in the absence of complete and reliable official information?
Transit through Moldova is more expensive for Ukrainian cargo
At a government meeting, this information was finally presented to Moldovan agribusiness operators. For now, it’s in the form of a presentation, not a regulation. But that’s better than “officially—almost nothing.”
It turned out that:
– rail freight rates for Moldovan and Ukrainian customers differ; even with discounts, Ukrainian traders will pay no less for the services of the Moldovan rail operator than Moldovan traders do;
– Requests from Moldovan customers for freight transportation via the Moldovan railway will be given priority;
– Ukrainian cargo will be transported in Ukrainian railcars; in other words, no one is taking Moldovan railcars away from Moldovan farmers;
– The estimated volume of Ukrainian transit is 150,000 metric tons per month, totaling 600,000 metric tons by the end of 2026 (this was officially announced earlier, though without a monthly schedule).
Of course, this does not eliminate “secondary risks.” For example, Moldovan traders have previously noted that even if the railcars and locomotives used in transit from Ukraine are Ukrainian, the infrastructure (rail lines, switching yards, maintenance crews, etc.) will remain Moldovan. And it will be partially occupied with servicing Ukrainian transit. In any case, this will negatively impact the freight schedules of Moldovan clients.
However, as Moldovan traders themselves acknowledge, these are secondary details—potential (rather than actual) logistical risks.
The authorities have quite convincingly countered the main arguments “against” with arguments “in favor” of Ukrainian transit.
Moldovan agribusiness operators also note that the “PR-driven hype” surrounding rail transport will be followed by its actual implementation.
In reality, however, traffic volume will depend heavily on:
– the integrity of Ukrainian infrastructure adjacent to the border with Moldova, which is problematic in the context of a “total war of attrition”;
– the efficiency of border services at the border between the Republic of Moldova and Romania; recent events show that traffic jams stretching for many kilometers at border crossings and port terminals are by no means a far-fetched scenario.
For now, however, the Moldovan public has had the opportunity to see for itself that the new government is a grandmaster at playing the “PR game.” In this game, farmers have been cast in the role of impatient and self-serving egoists.
Licensing Imports from Ukraine—A“Win-Win”Strategy forthe Moldovan Government
Licensing imports of Ukrainian agricultural products into Moldova initially appeared to be an issue on which the parties to the dialogue could well agree on a compromise solution.
First, unexpectedly, Moldovan traders (“Agrocereale”) supported the farmers (“Forța Fermierilor”), stating that licensing was appropriate.
Moreover, in a comment to Logos Press, a representative of the traders’ association noted that when the licensing regime for imports of Ukrainian grain and oilseeds was abolished last year, “there was no practical need, since these products were more expensive on the Ukrainian market at that time and were not being imported into Moldova.”
Now, in the context of the shipping blockade, the risk of a price collapse for Ukrainian agricultural products is real. This means that Moldovan farmers should be reassured—at least by reinstating the licensing procedure for imports from Ukraine.
This is all the more true given that, in cases involving genuinely scarce raw materials—in particular, soybean meal—Moldovan farmers have been receptive to imports from Ukraine to meet the needs of the Moldovan livestock sector.
In this regard, Prime Minister Vasile Tofan’s statement following the meeting—that “no matter how you look at it, we’ll have to take someone’s side”—seems ambiguous. Moldovan grain producers and traders, livestock farmers, and (even some) processors are all on the same side in the issue of licensing Ukrainian imports. Clearly, the other side consists solely of the Ukrainian side.
However, even in this situation, the Moldovan government has a strong, “win-win” position. If, at today’s final meeting at the Ministry of Agriculture, farmers are told that the licensing process for Ukrainian agricultural imports will be reinstated, this will mean that the government has made a major concession to local farmers (on an issue that is secondary at the moment). If the licensing is denied, the government will demonstrate its commitment to principle—Vasile Tofan was initially opposed to “bureaucratic barriers” to trade—and its determination to support Ukraine during the war.
