Energy Minister Dorin Jungietu recently reiterated that the inevitable rise in gas rates for end users is a reality the public will have to accept in the coming months.
The ministry’s rhetoric is firm: rising exchange prices in the region are making current rates unprofitable for state-owned operators, and postponing adjustments only creates serious financial risks for infrastructure companies.
In addition to gas, the ministry is already warning of a possible increase in electricity prices, proposing a shift toward regular tariff revisions.
This position has sparked a wave of outrage and a sharp reaction from both the public and the political opposition. For citizens, yet another rate hike appears to be a sign of institutional helplessness on the part of government agencies and the state-owned supplier Energocom.
The political opposition points out that the authorities are once again shifting all risks and the financial burden onto the shoulders of ordinary families and businesses, while regulators and officials throw up their hands, citing solely “external market conditions on European exchanges”.
However, the key question that many are asking today—but which is being sidestepped in government offices—is this: Was the rate hike really inevitable? Prices on the exchanges have risen, but why didn’t the responsible agencies take steps to build up certain gas reserves at reasonable prices to cushion the price shock?
To find answers to these questions, we must be guided not by emotions, but by concrete data and arguments. Let’s try to do that.
SA Energocom’s Financial Capacity and Ability to Build Reserves
By early spring 2026, the state-owned company SA Energocom had a record amount of liquidity and credit resources in its entire history.
According to data from the Public Property Agency (APP), as reported by Logos Press, Energocom’s net profit for 2025 amounted to 430.6 million lei on revenue of 20.28 billion lei. A total of 198.3 million lei was transferred to the budget in the form of dividends, while the company’s retained earnings amounted to approximately 232 million lei (~12 million euros).
In addition, the company had a revolving credit line from the EBRD in the amount of 300 million euros and a letter of credit line for 100 million euros (a total of 400 million euros).
Taking into account its own working capital and credit lines, Energocom’s total working capital as of March 2026 was estimated at 410–420 million euros.
And by the spring of 2026—when profits had been calculated, working capital from winter deliveries had been received, and the EBRD credit line was available—the market conditions were extremely favorable for making purchases in advance.
April is traditionally a period of the lowest seasonal prices on European exchanges (the start of the season for injecting gas into underground storage facilities). Furthermore, by this time, the active phase of the conflict surrounding Iran had subsided, which eased tensions in global markets and contributed to lower prices.
The situation in regional markets during this period was as follows:
|
Exchange / Region |
Market Type | Average Price in April 2026 |
Price in USD per 1,000 m³ |
|
Balkan Gas Hub (Bulgaria) |
Spot (Day-Ahead / Month-Ahead) | 34.27 EUR/MWh | ~$365–375 |
|
BRM (Romania) |
Spot / Short-term | 35.00–37.00 EUR/MWh |
~$370–395 |
| BRM East Power (Moldova) | Local balancing market |
36.00–38.00 EUR/MWh |
~$385–405 |
Simple calculations show that with a market capitalization of 400 million euros and an average spring price of 35 EUR/MWh (~375 USD / 1,000 m³), Energocom could have locked in and purchased up to 1.06–1.1 billion cubic meters of gas at April rates.
This fully covers the annual demand of the Right Bank of the Dniester (approximately 800–900 million m³). And the surplus could be directed to the Moldovan Thermal Power Plant to generate cheaper electricity on a tolling basis.
Features of Gas Contracts
In practice, several types of contracts are predominantly used for advance gas purchases.
Here is a clear and concise breakdown from AI (which is appropriate in this context):
Forward Contracts (Forward / FW):
A bilateral , customized “future” transaction on the over-the-counter (OTC) market.
- Key terms: The parties directly agree on the volume, price, and delivery location of the gas. The contract is tailored to the buyer’s specific needs. Gas delivery at the end of the term is mandatory.
- Pros: Perfectly tailored to the business (any volume and delivery point can be selected); the price is fixed—there is no risk of price spikes.
- Disadvantages: High risk that the counterparty will go bankrupt and fail to deliver; the contract cannot be quickly resold or canceled.
Futures Contracts:
A standardized financial instrument traded exclusively on an exchange.
- Key terms: All terms (lot size, gas quality, delivery dates) are strictly defined by the exchange. Only the price is variable. Requires daily margin deposits. Typically closed out before delivery to realize a financial profit or loss.
- Pros: Zero risk of fraud (the exchange guarantees payments); extremely high liquidity—a contract can be bought or sold in a second at any time.
- Cons: Risk of “margin calls” (if the price moves against you, the exchange requires you to immediately deposit additional funds into your account; otherwise, it will close the trade at a loss); strict exchange rules (you cannot change the volume or delivery location).
Index-Linked / Spot Contracts (Index-Linked / Spot)
Purchasing gas “here and now” at current market prices at trading hubs (e.g., DA or WD on TTF).
- Key terms: Gas is purchased at the price established by the market for the current day or month (based on published price indices). Delivery occurs immediately or within the next few days.
- Pros: The fairest market price at the moment (no overpayment if the market falls); no need to commit to obligations months in advance.
- Disadvantages: Complete lack of protection against price shocks; if a crisis begins in the winter and prices skyrocket fivefold, you’ll have to buy gas at that exorbitant price.
We’d like to note separately that the AI not only presented this information but also kindly summarized the main differences between these contracts “in a single sentence” on its own initiative:
- With a forward contract, you sleep soundly (the price is fixed), but you’re relying on a specific partner.
- With a futures contract, you sleep soundly (the exchange protects you from fraud), but you must have plenty of cash on hand in case of price fluctuations.
- With an index, you capitalize on the market right now, but you risk going broke if prices spike.
Now, armed with this basic information, let’s consider what prevented SA Energocom in March and April of this year—when market prices were quite reasonable and there was sufficient cash on hand—from stockpiling gas in advance at those prices.
Institutional Restrictions and Financial Risks
From the contract options listed, it’s not hard to guess that futures contracts aren’t suitable for a government purchaser. They’re of interest to exchange traders.
That leaves forward and index contracts. Based on statements by officials and Energocom’s practice, we see that Moldova does not use the first option at all. All contracts are pegged to the price index at the time of delivery.
A logical question arises: why? What prevented them from purchasing in April at a price of approximately 35 EUR/MWh (which, incidentally, is lower than the 37 EUR/MWh built into the tariff—or at least on par with it)? Then there would be no need to discuss tariff increases today. Or, at the very least, the adjustment would not have been so significant.
It must be acknowledged that Energocom faces certain restrictions on the use of fixed-price forward contracts. These are primarily related to the EBRD loan.
The EBRD’s €400 million credit line is strictly governed by the bank’s regulations (EBRD Procurement Policies). To avoid corruption risks, lenders require transparent pricing, which is best achieved by linking prices to public EU exchange indices as of the delivery date.
But that is only one side of the issue. As we have already noted, at the end of the previous fall-winter period (precisely by April 2026), Energocom had significant equity at its disposal—profit and working capital.
Few would dare to risk borrowed funds from international institutions on speculative forward markets (and, in any case, it is not permitted).
However, the company could easily have used its available net profit (232 million lei, plus the nearly 200 million lei in dividends paid to the budget) and its own working capital without relying on the EBRD. In that case, the company would be taking a commercial risk only with its own capital.
The obvious benefit of such a decision to enter into firm forward contracts is the ability to build up winter reserves at a good price and avoid raising rates for end consumers. And—as a bonus—it would avoid political and social tensions in society.
But under such a scenario, Energocom would have had to shoulder all the risks itself. If prices on regional markets had fallen rather than risen, the company would now be facing the same barrage of criticism, but with a different message: why did they mismanage “public” funds and purchase expensive gas?
As it stands, the state supplier cheerfully reports that gas contracts have been signed practically through the end of the fall-winter period of 2026–2027, and Moldova will not be left without gas.
As for the price—well, all the risks will be passed on to consumers’ bills. If market prices rise another 50% or even 100%, officials can once again throw up their hands and declare mournfully, “Such are the laws of the market!” And once again, they’ll demand a tariff adjustment, citing the inevitability of such a step.
By the way, there’s another option for trading gas on international markets—the so-called “hybrid hedging instrument.” This involves purchasing call options. It works as follows: by paying a small premium (around $15–20 per 1,000 m³), the buyer can “insure” against a price ceiling (for example, $400). If the market rises to $560, the right to buy at $400 is exercised. If the market falls, the option expires worthless, and the gas is purchased more cheaply on the spot market.
Possible Scenarios and Risk Minimization
In conducting this analysis and these calculations, we certainly did not overlook logistics and storage capabilities. These also come at a cost. According to various estimates, delivering gas via interconnectors and transmission pipelines adds between 3 and 7 EUR/MWh (~$35–75 per 1,000 m³) to the price, depending on various factors.
But even taking these circumstances into account, it is possible to calculate how much Moldova could have saved on forward gas purchases in April if it had taken the risk.
Natural gas prices as of August 19, 2026, show the following fuel costs on regional exchanges:
– Bulgaria (BGH): approximately 52.64–52.80 EUR/MWh (~$560–570 per 1,000 m³);
– Romania (BRM): in the range of 51.50–53.00 EUR/MWh;
– Moldova (BRM East): no specific prices are available, but the exchange typically follows the regional trend with a logistics surcharge.
Based on this, we can develop approximate scenarios for Moldova’s gas supply:
– Scenario A (spot purchases in August): ~$560 (base) + $40 (logistics) = ~$600.
– Scenario B (spring fix / forward contract): ~$375 (April) + $45 (storage and transportation) = ~$420.
As we can see, the potential savings could have amounted to ~$180 per 1,000 m³. But who could have known that the exchange price would rise?
This leads to an ambiguous conclusion. Could Moldova have stocked up on cheap gas in the spring? Technically, logistically, and financially—yes. Energocom’s equity and profits would have allowed it to build a safety cushion at fixed prices or hedge against price fluctuations with options.
The decision not to hedge was driven by political risk: if the price in the fall had fallen below the spring price, company management would have had to justify the “overpayment” to regulatory authorities. And the country’s leadership and government would have had to explain the procurement “schemes” to citizens.
Thus, using exclusively floating-index contracts (TTF + margin) allows the state-owned trader to completely absolve itself of responsibility for market fluctuations. The timely recalculation of tariffs by the National Energy Regulatory Agency (ANRE) automatically passes any price spikes on European exchanges directly on to end consumers.
You can judge for yourself who is being held hostage by the market in this situation. You can also judge for yourself how well the strategic planning of Energocom and the ministry overseeing it is structured.
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