How the EU Could Lead a Coalition of Western Middle Powers

How the EU Can Lead the Rest of the West

MILAN — At the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney described a “rift” in the global order and called on middle powers to “act collectively.” He warned that while great powers may (for now) afford to “go it alone” in this new Hobbesian world, middle powers must come to the negotiating table. Otherwise, they risk ending up “on the menu.”

However, while some may view the European Union as a natural partner for such efforts, the EU itself seems to see itself as something greater.

Instead of bringing together partners from around the world, the EU has spent recent months demonstrating its economic might, which is impressive: although the European economy is slightly smaller than those of the U.S. and China, it is several times larger than those of Japan, the United Kingdom, and India.

Furthermore, it seeks to strengthen its sovereignty—from the digital sphere to defense. This is not a bloc willing to settle for the status of a “middle power.”

This approach is misguided. Although Europe is not simply another middle power, it is also not a “great power,” which Carney defines as a country possessing “market size, military potential, and levers of influence that allow it to dictate terms” on the world stage. This is especially true in relations with an exploitative United States and a coercive China.

However , Europe is an ideal candidate to lead a group of like-minded middle powers, which Carney envisioned not as an American-style hegemon but as primus inter pares (first among equals).

The list of potential partners is long. The closest among them are Switzerland, Norway, and the United Kingdom. But Canada and, in the longer term, Australia, Japan, and South Korea are also good candidates. These are stable, high-income democracies that generally share the EU’s position on issues related to multilateral rule-making, supply chain resilience, and digital governance.

A group consisting of these countries and the EU would boast a GDP exceeding that of the United States and a combined manufacturing output close to that of China.

The EU Must Serve as a Catalyst

However, such a group cannot form spontaneously. Therefore, the EU must act as a catalyst and leader of the “Compact for Open and Resilient Economies” (CORE).

The first step would be to convene a summit in Brussels aimed at establishing a commitment—no formal treaty is required to start with—to consult with one another before making decisions on trade or industrial policy that could have a significant impact on other CORE countries.

In particular, the EU commits to seeking the views of its partners before adopting relevant legislation. In addition, it will allow CORE countries to participate (without voting rights) in some of the numerous working groups and expert panels that are developing the details of legislative and other proposals. The EU will make final decisions independently, in accordance with its internal procedures.

The EU’s structure allows for the implementation of such an informal and flexible arrangement. As stated in Article 217 of the Treaty on the EU, “The Union may conclude agreements with one or more third countries or international organizations establishing an association involving mutual rights and obligations, joint action, and specific procedures.”

Agreements with the EU’s close neighbors, such as Switzerland, reflect this principle. A more formal, albeit narrower, precedent exists in the field of scientific research: a number of non-EU countries participate in the “Horizon Europe” program as “associated members,” who make financial contributions and help develop research programs.

Nevertheless, for the CORE program to work, the EU would have to change some of its policies. Consider, for example, the Industrial Acceleration Act (IAA) proposed by the European Commission in March of this year. The IAA calls for granting preferential treatment to goods produced in the EU—following the example of China and the U.S.—with the aim of preventing the loss of its industrial base due to predatory competition.

However, the bloc’s share of global industrial production is only about 15% (and continues to decline). This means that bringing entire supply chains back to the EU would be virtually impossible.

A New Strategy for Europe

The“ MadewithEurope” approach, in which raw materials and components from CORE countries are treated as equivalent to European goods, allows this problem to be avoided.

After all, CORE not only encompasses a much broader economic region; its potential members possess capabilities and resources that the EU lacks. Australia and Canada have raw materials; South Korea produces microchips; and Switzerland is a leader in biotechnology.

The “Made with Europe” strategy would also strengthen trust among partners whose combined markets remain vital for EU exporters.

One might argue that raw materials and supplies from EU countries will always be more reliable than those from third countries. However, the risk of supply disruptions from like-minded partners is minimal. The CORE countries will be economically and geopolitically aligned with the EU, recognizing that, acting alone, their influence on the global stage is minimal.

Another issue the EU must address is its new, highly restrictive steel import regime. Currently, the new rules—which cut duty-free import quotas in half and double tariffs to 50 percent—apply even to like-minded trading partners with whom the EU has free trade agreements (with the exception of Norway).

This situation must change: CORE countries should be exempt from the new regime.

More broadly, CORE can avoid such destabilizing unilateral actions by ensuring that consultations begin as early as the policy-drafting stage. At the very least, this will help minimize the destabilizing effects of any decision on other CORE economies, whose goodwill is vital to Europe. It may even pave the way for more effective joint action that benefits all parties.

Europe faces a choice: either to scale back its ambitions to a narrow understanding of sovereignty and an unrealistic vision of a solitary industrial revival, or to lead the process of building a community of open, sustainable, and like-minded economies.

The goal is not to replace the United States as the global hegemon—such an outcome is both impossible and undesirable for the EU. Rather, it is about offering what our world of resource-extracting superpowers so desperately needs: leadership without domination.