
On August 19 (after a five-year hiatus), the Ministry of Agriculture is convening a meeting of the “Council on the Grain and Processed Products Commodity Line.” The next day, a meeting is scheduled between the prime minister and grain industry stakeholders: the ministries (of agriculture and infrastructure), transportation companies, and trade and farmer organizations.
“Forța Fermierilor”: A Prize for the Studio!
Both “loyal” and “opposition” agribusiness organizations have been invited to these meetings. Among them is “Forța Fermierilor,” the association of grain and oilseed producers.
This is a well-deserved prize for the association. Since this entire “momentum” began with the Association’s protest (which was entirely in line with reality) regarding the lack of transparency in the Moldovan authorities’ decision-making on the “most-favored-nation treatment for Ukrainian agricultural transit” and the regulation of imports of raw materials from Ukraine into the Moldovan market.
Now, as Alexander Slusari, director of “Forța Fermierilor,” noted in a comment to Logos Press, the content of the dialogue at meetings at the Ministry of Agriculture and within the government will provide answers to at least two key sets of questions.
First, does the government have only a political memorandum of intent, or does it have a detailed business plan for ensuring and regulating “Ukrainian transit”?
Specifically: what are the planned volumes of Ukrainian goods transported via Moldova’s railways; what is the delivery schedule; how are slots allocated in the queue for transportation services; whose railcars and locomotives will be used, whose costs (for fuel) and expenses (due to potential disruptions in the flow of goods) will be borne, and who will handle crisis management in what is, in essence, an emergency situation.
Second —is the government now ready, so to speak, “on shore,” to discuss the conditions of the upcoming “voyage” with traders and farmers? Or will the discussion revolve around a ready-made directive being issued “from above” in a mandatory manner, which all agribusiness entities will be required to follow?
The “Food Pyramid” of the Grain Business
In a sense, the Cabinet of Ministers’ position on licensing imports of Ukrainian grain and oilseeds into Moldova will serve as an indicator of whether “there is still an opportunity to change anything.”
If the decision has already been finalized by someone without regard for the opinions of local farmers, licensing will not be introduced. In other words, farmers will remain at the very bottom of the “food chain”—at the base of the pyramid—with no alternatives.
If the decision on licensing (which essentially amounts to blocking imports of raw materials) is adopted, farmers will have a small, but still a point to make in their dialogue with local grain and oilseed processors (who, in a number of specific cases, also act as traders—exporting both raw materials and processed products).
Essentially, within the “triangle of power”—government agencies, holding companies (traders and processors), and farmers—a “battle for second place” is currently underway.
If traders manage to “form an alliance” with farmers, the authorities will have to yield—or rather, back down from their most controversial decisions. For example, from the plan to grant a 50-percent discount on rail transportation within Moldova only to “Ukrainian transit operators,” and not to Moldovan traders alongside them.
If a “corporate alliance” forms between government institutions and agri-food holdings, farmers will become the “crushed base” of the pyramid of large-scale public-private partnerships.
If the government makes a “populist decision” to curry favor with farmers by introducing licensing requirements for imports of Ukrainian raw materials, Moldova’s large agri-food businesses—which are focused almost exclusively on exports—will go on the “offensive.”
What consequences will this have? Last time, following the logistics crisis in Moldova triggered in 2022–23 “Ukrainian transit,” the licensing of imports of raw materials from Ukraine into the Moldovan market made it possible, according to the leadership of “Forța Fermierilor,” to “stabilize the market—stop the decline in prices for grain and sunflower seeds.”
However, on the other hand, many experts agree that the licensing (the blocking of shipments) of Ukrainian sunflower seeds triggered a year-long “technical shutdown” of Moldova’s largest sunflower oil producer and a sharp decline in its exports—resulting in financial losses running into the millions.
In short, the “Tofan government” found itself faced with the urgent need to ease social tensions in a situation where there is, in principle, no “good solution for everyone”—Moldovan farmers, traders, transport companies, Ukraine, and the European Commission. A compromise must be found, preferably one that favors Moldovan residents.





















