Ukrainian authorities are urgently seeking alternatives to maritime freight transport. The goal is clear: they need to urgently ensure the supply of resources to their economy during this escalation of the war, as well as the export of agri-food products. The alternatives are obvious: multimodal, road, and rail transport.
The value of any initiative lies in the quality of its implementation. From this perspective, the efforts of Ukraine’s main railway operator to assist the Ukrainian government in finding alternatives to maritime transport are worthy of respect. However, respect is a “two-way street.” This means the main question is whether Ukraine and its neighboring countries will succeed in finding a formula for mutually beneficial cooperation regarding the logistics of Ukrainian goods flows.
Ukrzaliznytsia has stated that the goal of the meetings is “to bring together all interested parties from Ukraine and neighboring countries to find practical solutions.” During the meetings, participants intend to discuss ways to eliminate bottlenecks at border crossings, increase their throughput capacity, and coordinate efforts among carriers, terminal operators, shippers, and railway administrations on both sides of the border, according to ukragroconsult.
Earlier, Ukrzaliznytsia asked Ukrainian agricultural exporters to identify priority transport routes in the event of prolonged disruptions at the ports of Greater Odessa. The company has also begun assessing the technical capabilities of border crossings, the condition of 1,435-mm-gauge railcars, and the need for additional personnel in the event of increased freight volumes.
What isMoldova’s interestin this?
It is not obvious in this scenario, and it is highly questionable whether there is any interest at all. Both Ukraine and Moldova, as well as Romania, have produced bumper harvests—at least of grains and first-group oilseeds. Consequently, in the markets of the Black Sea region, the European Union, and the Middle East, these countries are competitors to a greater or lesser extent. Moreover, as many experts from all countries in the region agree, competitive advantages specifically in the field of transportation logistics are becoming a key factor in economic —and, to some extent, political—success.
Meanwhile, Moldovan farmers have not yet forgotten how, at the start of the war on Ukrainian territory, the Moldovan authorities (unlike, for example, the Polish authorities) opened up their country’s logistics capacity as widely as possible for the westward transit of Ukrainian grain and other agri-food products.
As a result, according to respected agribusiness leaders in Moldova, they found themselves at the end of the “export queue,” and their own grain and other raw materials—which could have been sold on foreign markets at competitive prices—were blocked within Moldova for a year and a half. In addition, some of the Ukrainian transit products remained on the Moldovan market, which also contributed to the weakening of the domestic agricultural commodities market.
At this point in the marketing season, prices for many types of agricultural products in Ukraine are slightly higher than in Moldova. Therefore, as MAIA State Secretary Vasile Sharban rightly noted in an interview, there is no need to require import licenses for Ukrainian agricultural products entering the Moldovan market.
Nevertheless, are there other risks associated with potentially increased Ukrainian transit through Moldovan territory to Romania? Especially since Moldovan traders, just like their Ukrainian counterparts, will obviously be interested in taking advantage of the logistical capabilities of the Romanian port of Constanța.
