
As part of the MAAM project, in collaboration with ActiveWatch and Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa, the Independent Journalism Center (IJC) published an alternative report on the state of press freedom in the Republic of Moldova against the backdrop of the EU’s enlargement processes.
In June 2024, the European Union began accession negotiations with Moldova. In this context, the European Commission’s 2025 report assessed the country’s readiness regarding freedom of expression as “moderate,” while noting achievements such as new legislation on access to information,
The report mentions the Media Subsidy Fund, revised regulations on audiovisual content and advertising, as well as strengthened laws protecting journalists.
However, the assessment also noted persistent structural problems, including media ownership concentration, ongoing political influence on editorial independence, increasing intimidation of journalists by private individuals, and the need to ensure that measures aimed at countering foreign information manipulation and interference comply with EU standards on freedom of expression.
Against this backdrop and based on the European Commission’s recommendations, this Shadow Report examines and analyzes the systemic challenges and institutional responses that Moldova faced during 2025 and the first half of 2026.
Key Challenges Facing Moldovan Journalism
The report identifies five main challenges, namely: the development of the legal and institutional framework; the safety of journalists and institutional responses to attacks, including safety online and offline, risks during elections and protests, as well as specific risks faced by journalists covering events in Gagauzia and the Transnistria region; strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) and other forms of legal pressure; access to information of public interest; foreign manipulation of information and interference; national security; and restrictions on media activities.
Undoubtedly, 2025 was a pivotal year for press freedom in Moldova, as the country faced both significant obstacles during the 2025 election campaign—such as foreign manipulation of information and persistent political polarization— as well as the accelerated implementation of a series of legal and institutional reforms in line with EU standards, which led to the creation of a more pluralistic media ecosystem, according to the IJC.
Ultimately, this process represented a complex transition period in which increased regulation and public support for journalism coexisted with weak safeguards, uneven enforcement, and new forms of pressure.
Blocking of Websites
The report notes that Moldova continues to block news sites that the authorities find objectionable. Moreover, this is often done without sufficient justification.
“Blocking has become a central issue for media freedom,” the report states.
OSCE/ODIHR reported that during the first nine months of 2025, more than 85 websites were blocked on national security grounds, including 35 during the election campaign and 22 on the “day of silence” during the campaign. The underlying decisions by the Information and Security Service were not publicly available, and there was no comprehensive registry that would allow users, hosting providers, journalists, or courts to determine which address had been blocked, for what content, under which provision, and for how long.
“The European Court of Human Rights considers the complete blocking of websites to be an extreme measure, comparable in effect to banning a newspaper or television channel,” the authors of the alternative report clarify.
They recommend adopting a unified, human-rights-based system for blocking websites. Legislation should reserve for the courts the right to issue standard blocking orders and require precise identification of the URL, justification, necessity, technical accuracy, notification, a fixed duration, automatic expiration, and the maintenance of a public registry. An emergency administrative blocking order must automatically trigger judicial proceedings within 24–48 hours. Infrastructure-wide blocking should be prohibited unless a court demonstrates that a more targeted approach is ineffective and assesses the foreseeable collateral effects.























