The Confusing Endgame of the War with Iran

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In the U.S., officials vacillate between emphasizing regime change and assuming the operation will be limited to the targeted destruction of nuclear and ballistic missile sites as well as the Iranian navy. President Donald Trump, for his part, has called for unconditional surrender, insisting that Iran install “acceptable” new leadership. But he also said the US has already “won in many ways” in Iran – just “not enough.”

Trump clearly wants to avoid a protracted military conflict that would undermine support among his isolationist MAGA base. At the same time, he needs to limit the energy shock: Brent crude oil prices have already risen 29% to nearly $120 a barrel. The same cannot be said for Israel, which has targeted Iran’s oil facilities, including fuel depots in densely populated Tehran, as part of its “total war” strategy.

A ricochet to its neighbors

The US appears far more concerned than the Israelis about the impact of the war on its Gulf allies. Unlike Israel and Trump, who wants to play a role in Iran’s choice of leader, the Gulf states recognize the flawed logic behind the war. They tried to promote a diplomatic solution before the strikes began, not out of sympathy for the Islamic Republic, but because they knew they would be the ones to bear the brunt of Iran’s retaliation.

Now Iran’s strikes on U.S. military bases and oil facilities in the Persian Gulf are undermining those countries’ hard-won image as a safe haven for international business, which is critical to their efforts to diversify their economies with oil. If Iran targets their oil fields, global energy markets will face even greater disruption.

More broadly, the Gulf states realize that regime change is a long historical process that war is unlikely to accelerate, and that demands for unconditional surrender could prolong the struggle and increase its cost. After the Athenians defeated the ancient Persians at the Battle of Salamis (480 B.C.), they demonstrated wisdom by not insisting on total surrender-a choice that paved the way for a final diplomatic settlement.

On the contrary, as historian Ian Kershaw has shown, Allied demands for Nazi Germany’s complete surrender may have encouraged the regime to continue fighting to the bitter end. Today, Iran is showing similar defiance. Not only has it chosen another hardliner, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, as its new supreme leader, but the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has rejected President Massoud Pezeshkian’s claim that Iran will stop attacking Gulf states.

A matter of survival for Iran

For the Islamic Republic, this war is a matter of survival, so it is using every lever at its disposal. In addition to attacking energy infrastructure, it has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, the only channel for transporting about 20% of the world’s oil and natural gas reserves (including Iran’s own exports).

It has also threatened to spread the conflict beyond the Middle East, targeting a British airbase in Cyprus and launching a ballistic missile into Turkish airspace. With Iran possessing nearly 1,000 pounds of uranium enriched to 60%, nuclear risks are rising rapidly.

If the Islamic Republic eventually falls, there is no reason to expect an orderly transition to a more moderate government. A descent into chaos, extremism, and violence is far more likely.

Whatever radical groups emerge, they may well have Iranian nuclear materials at their disposal – a risk that no international agreement can contain. A nuclear Iran would also trigger a regional nuclear arms race, with countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia seeking to build the bomb.

Even a decisive U.S.-Israeli victory would be an unwelcome development for the Gulf states, as well as countries like Egypt and Turkey. They want Israel to be their partner, not a regional hegemon. Moreover, the prospect of outside forces overthrowing regimes they do not like (or supporting popular uprisings) is far from attractive to Arab autocracies.

It is unclear at what point in this process the capricious Trump will look for a way out, declaring an ambiguous victory and turning his attention to something else. His calculations will depend on four key factors: energy prices, the stock market, the midterm elections and the upcoming summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping. He certainly hoped to control nearly 30% of the world’s oil reserves (Venezuela and Iran) by the time he met with Xi. Alas, Iran is a much tougher nut to crack than Venezuela, and Trump will have to temper his unrealistic expectations.

The key problem is Israel

But putting the genie back in the bottle will not be easy, especially because Israel’s leadership is not under the same political pressure as Trump.

Decades of ideological conditioning have convinced the Israeli public that the Iranian regime is evil incarnate and must be eradicated. Moreover, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu considers “total victory” in Iran, as well as in Gaza and over Hezbollah in Lebanon, an integral part of his political legacy, which is currently tainted by broken promises and allegations of corruption.

The cost of achieving this largely unattainable goal may be higher than Netanyahu envisioned. A growing sense among Americans that Israel has dragged them into a costly war of their own choosing could further damage the country’s already tarnished image to the point where alienation becomes a real strategic threat.

This is the last thing Israel needs at a time when it is positioning itself as the only state in the Middle East that rejects the very idea of a negotiated settlement, whether it be over Iran or Palestine.

Shlomo Ben-Ami

Shlomo Ben-Ami, former Israeli foreign minister, is vice president of the Toledo International Peace Center and author of Prophets Without Honor: The 2000 Camp David Summit and the End of the Two-State Solution (Oxford University Press, 2022).