With surprise, Logos Press has read the conclusions of the Agency of Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre (AGCC) on the situation with real estate valuation on the territory of the former Republican Stadium.
On the surface – a public conflict between agencies. In the depths – a systemic failure.
Budget – silence. Private interests – epiphany
While the object was under the state budget, it was evaluated, but there were problems with the cost. Or rather, with the valuation itself. No one wanted to get involved with a state asset when it came to the budget. So they decided to ignore the valuation issues.
As a result, the “value” was not the result of analysis, but an administrative decision: the figure was assigned, the discussion was closed, and the valuation was removed from sight. The law and standards played the role of background.
But as soon as the story emerged from the mode of “budgetary silence” into the zone of private rights and compensation, the system suddenly had a vision. The same institutions that yesterday were quietly living with obvious mistakes, today suddenly started talking about “violations of the law” and “unacceptable figures”.
The problem is not that the violations were discovered. The problem is why they were “discovered” now.
The laws haven’t changed. The commissions are essentially the same. The methodological basis has not changed. Only the direction of interests has changed.
Evaluators as support staff
This story revealed an unpleasant truth: the professional appraisal environment in Moldova has degenerated to a service function. Instead of an independent institution, which should fix the market reality, we see a flexible tool that adapts to the current political order.
Today, a figure can be accepted silently.
Tomorrow it can be declared criminally low.
The day after tomorrow, it can be recognized as acceptable again.
No explanation. No public methodology. No accountability.
This is not how the institutions of the rule of law behave, but how the thieves at the train station behave: the ball disappears and appears depending on who is holding the table.
A separate touch is the figure of the appraiser, who yesterday was part of the institutional mechanism, but today enters the market as an independent player and behaves as if he is above standards and above the law. This is not a personal story. This is a systemic effect. When the state has been showing for years that appraisal is not a responsibility, but a service “for a task”, it brings up such players.
A commission that “does not “decide” but passes judgment
The AGCC commission’s formula – “we don’t express an opinion on value, but value violates the law” – is the quintessence of institutional cynicism.
It’s like a judge saying, “I haven’t read the case yet, but I’ve already reached a verdict.”
The Commission becomes a body that is formally responsible for nothing, actually determines the outcome, while hiding behind the status of “advisory”.
Formally, the commission can claim that it has no say on expropriation. But the problem is different: it actually intervenes in the expropriation, substituting the legal process with departmental fog.
But we are talking about expropriation, a rigid legal procedure
Expropriation is not an expert opinion or a commentary. It is a procedure with clear consequences:
- Constitution of the RM, Art. 46 (3): expropriation is permissible only for public benefit and with fair prior compensation.
- ECtHR practice (James v. UK, Scordino v. Italy): compensation must be reasonably related to market value; undercompensation is a direct violation of the right to property.
- Law No. 488/1999, Art. 8: compensation is determined on the basis of market value – the most probable price of the open market.
And there is no need for complicated formulas here. A common sense test is sufficient: would the owner voluntarily sell the object at the assessed price on the open market?
If the answer is “no” and the discrepancy is about 85%, it is no longer a “difference of professional opinion”. It is the risk of unfair compensation with all the legal consequences: courts, international lawsuits and lost cases.
When the state cannot agree with itself
The most absurd and most dangerous point of this story is that two state institutions cannot determine the rules of the game, even though the state itself made the deal.
This is no longer a “technical dispute”.
It is a disgrace to the institutions.
It is the perfect environment for corruption.
It is a demonstration of the complete toothlessness of the commission and the entire management circuit around the agency.
In reality, decisions are made by a narrow circle. The rest of the participants are carefully tinkering with the protocols so as not to be the last ones when the wind changes direction again.
Conclusion
The story of Republic Stadium is not a story of misjudgment.
It is a story about how in Moldova the evaluation turns into a ritual, the law into a decoration, and the commissions into an instrument of political expediency.
It is no longer about the stadium.
It is about the fact that in the country you cannot trust a single signature or a single stamp when serious money is at stake.
And that’s a systemic risk. For property. For investment. And for the state, which with its own hands is undermining the remnants of trust in itself.
