The reason for the disputes is asymmetry in trade. And both countries talk about it. However, objective analysis shows that, on the one hand, Kiev actively protects the domestic market from cheap imports – especially cement and some metal products – through high anti-dumping duties. On the other hand, the Moldovan market as a whole remains open for Ukrainian products, especially agricultural goods.
Trade flows: figures, imbalances and key positions
Although trade between the countries is carried out on the basis of a free trade agreement, the parties do introduce exemptions from this regime and periodic barriers to each other’s goods.
In 2025, trade turnover between Moldova and Ukraine amounted to about $1.4 billion, according to the National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova.
However, imports from Ukraine are estimated at $1.1 billion, which grew by a modest 0.15% last year. But supplies of Moldovan products are almost four times smaller – only $299.6 million. Moreover, they have decreased by almost 9% over 2025.
As we can see, the balance of trade remains noticeably positive for Ukraine. At the same time, Ukrainian exports to Moldova are represented by a wide range of goods, including those with high added value. At the same time, sales of goods from Moldova were not only significantly lower in volume, but also to a large extent realized at the expense of re-export of products from other countries.
This is confirmed by the structure of mutual trade. From Ukraine to Moldova were mainly supplied:
– metals and steel products;
– wood and wood products, including charcoal;
– dairy products, eggs, honey and other foodstuffs;
– plastics, electronics, machinery and equipment.
This structure reflects Ukraine’s export profile, with processed and natural products occupying key positions.
Moldovan shipments to Ukraine were noticeably smaller and mainly included:
– mineral fuels and oils (petroleum products, which Moldova does not produce on its own);
– beverages, alcoholic beverages;
– machine-building products and pharmaceuticals (some of which are also re-exported);
– plastic goods and other industrial goods.
These items indicate Moldova’s specialization in products of agricultural origin, petroleum products and semi-processed goods.
All this has affected the fact that Moldova’s trade deficit with Ukraine is more than $800 million, which is 2.5 times higher than the volume of Moldovan goods supplied to the neighboring country.
How Kiev protects its market: the cement mishap
Relations between Kiev and Chisinau in the trade sphere sometimes take a rather strange form and character. This is eloquently illustrated by the cement trade.
Ukraine has always been one of the key cement producers in the region. Until 2022, production was about 11 million tons, while domestic consumption was around 6-6.5 million tons (data from wits.worldbank.org).
This led to the country also acting as a major cement exporter, including to neighboring countries. According to the same source, in 2023 the country exported more than USD 73 million worth of Portland cement, including shipments to Romania, Poland, Hungary and Moldova. Supplies to Moldova are estimated at about 10.33 mln USD.
In Moldova, domestic cement production is estimated at about 2.5 million tons per year, while domestic demand is not even 1 million tons. This means that cement plants in the country have to export about 2/3 of their output.
Despite this, Chisinau does not limit cement imports from other countries. This is demonstrated by the supplies from Ukraine.
But Kiev protects its own market. By the decision of the Interdepartmental Commission on International Trade (ICIT) of May 21, 2019, anti-dumping duties were introduced on cement imports to Ukraine from Russia and Belarus. Strange as it may seem, the Republic of Moldova found itself in “company” with them. The amount of duty is 94.46% for cement from Moldova.
By ICIT decision №AD-579/2025/441-01 of May 21, 2025 these duties were extended until 2030. This leaves the Ukrainian market practically closed for export of Moldovan cement, as it is not economically profitable.
The official position of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine is formulated as follows: “These measures are aimed at protecting domestic producers from unfair competition and dumping supplies, which complies with WTO norms and supports the sustainability of the Ukrainian industry”.
This wording is supported by Ukrainian cement associations. Representatives of the industry emphasize that protection from dumping allows to preserve jobs and sustainability of enterprises in conditions of unstable demand and high production costs.
In Moldova, industry representatives also tried to draw the attention of the authorities to the problem and pointed to the disproportionality of trade policies of neighboring countries. But the government pretends that there is no such problem at all.
But pretending does not mean that the problem does not really exist. After all, Ukrainian cement enters the market without any barriers and duties.
At the same time, the picture is extremely interesting. If we carefully study various data from open Ukrainian sources, there are quite reasonable grounds to assert that it is Ukraine that is dumping in cement trade.
These data show that the average export price of Ukrainian cement is around $100-105/ton. Germany, Romania, Hungary and Austria are supplied at prices ranging from $86 to $105/ton. Even within Ukraine cement is not sold at prices below $95/ton.
And what about Moldova? Simple calculations show that the average price of cement supply to our country from Ukraine is about 70$/ton. That is, it is 30-33% cheaper than in other countries or even on the domestic market. And this happens against the background of rapid growth of supplies: if in 2020 imports of Ukrainian cement to Moldova amounted to about 100 thousand tons, in recent years it has exceeded the mark of 300 thousand tons.
Market participants are sure: in the case of Moldova, we are talking about dumping supplies.
But the paradox: nobody wants to talk about it “for the press”. Even sadder – they do not want to appeal to the authorities with a request for help. “It’s useless,” one of the major market players responded briefly when asked about the reasons.
Of course, by themselves, price differentials or protective measures are a common tool of trade policy. However, taken together, the observed trends form a persistent asymmetry of competitive conditions.
Conclusions: balance of interests or strategic unaffordability?
Trade relations between Ukraine and Moldova demonstrate a pronounced asymmetry: Ukraine seeks to protect the domestic market through anti-dumping measures and duties, especially in the cement segment. By the way, the same applies to restrictions on export of scrap metal from Ukraine, which also affects Moldova (in this case we proceed from the common interests of the country, including Transnistria). Over the last years Ukraine has maintained a strict regime of regulation of export of scrap metal, actually restricting its free export. For Moldova, taking into account the structure of the regional metallurgical market and the dependence of certain production segments on external raw materials, such measures have quite tangible economic consequences.
A similar situation is observed in trade in steel products. Ukraine consistently applies trade protection instruments to supplies from Moldova. We are talking about quite specific measures: anti-dumping duties on imports to Ukraine of carbon and other alloyed steel bars originating from the Republic of Moldova were introduced earlier and prolonged in early 2026 by the decision of the Interdepartmental Commission on International Trade of Ukraine.
In fact, this means the preservation of limited access of Moldovan producers to the Ukrainian market of steel products. At the same time, Ukrainian rolled steel products continue to be freely present in the Moldovan market. This configuration of trade regimes once again demonstrates the familiar asymmetry. And it is against this background that the general trade regime looks particularly indicative.
At the same time, the Moldovan market remains generally open for Ukrainian products.
There are, of course, some exceptions. Such as, for example, the suspension in January 2026 of imports of poultry meat and bird feed from Ukraine for food safety reasons. The National Food Safety Agency (ANSA) declared this measure temporary and due to the detection of the banned antibiotic metronidazole in feed exported from Ukraine.
Although the reason for the suspension is more than justified – concern for the safety of citizens – Kiev reacted very harshly. Ukraine said that if Moldova does not lift the ban, retaliatory measures will be introduced. In particular, on imports of alcoholic beverages from Moldova.
We, Moldova, are not afraid of this. At least because we have already been through it. But there is no doubt that it will not come to that. Chisinau will not quarrel with its close neighbor and will cancel the restrictions. We have already been through this – the interests of the local population and business are not a priority in Chisinau.
These examples say it best: relations between Moldova and Ukraine are neighborly, but not equal. Kiev, whenever possible, unashamedly applies measures to protect its market and restrict imports of products that can compete with local producers.
Chisinau, on the contrary, puts political expediency above trade interests. And even when the market requires specific protection measures or the creation of equal conditions for trade between countries (as in the case of cement or rolled metal products), the Moldovan authorities prefer to ignore the problems.
As a result, we get asymmetric trade and a negative balance 2.5 times higher than the volume of Moldovan products supplied to Ukraine.
