Q: Mr. Lipcan, sugar beet and sugar production once played an important role in the national economy. What is the situation now?
A.L.: The situation is far tougher than the “pink narrative” circulated every spring. The industry consists of two factories with about 500 employees, morally and physically obsolete, which simply cannot keep up with international trends and cost pressures. Meanwhile, some farmers in the north of the country stubbornly keep sowing beets merely to respect crop rotation, but the risks and uncertainty make them give up year after year.
The lack of a coherent recovery plan and the curtailment of support programs starting in 2024 hit the raw-material base directly. In real terms, over the past five years, the sugar beet areas harvested collapsed from 24,000 ha to about 11,000 ha in 2025. To survive, two factories need a critical mass of at least 20,000 ha to be cost-competitive. This objective is, at present, a utopia.
In reality, every spring “optimistic” figures are circulated through “pocket” unions and associations, which serve as a megaphone for disinformation. Yet in autumn we wake up to the bleak reality. 2025 was a disaster: although record harvests were promised on 15,000 ha, in reality only were confirmed on 11,000 ha, of which approx. 5,000 ha were left in the fields by year-end, unharvested and partially compromised. Thus, for the first time in Moldova’s history, we will have sugar production in February or March—an engineering and economic anomaly. The farmers who took the risks are not to blame, yet they are the ones who bear the financial consequences of disastrous planning.
For 2026, an even harsher scenario is taking shape: some specialists and farmers estimate a maximum of 7,000 ha, which means the industry will cover only 30–40% of the market’s needs. Farmers’ trust has been shattered by delays, logistical bottlenecks, and multiple technical failures. Under these conditions, it is very likely that in 2026 production will concentrate on a single industrial platform, that is, at just one factory, marking the beginning of the end for this business model.
Q: If I understand correctly, Moldova is losing markets, while farmers are left alone with the losses…
A.L.: Exactly. When production costs explode because of operational and managerial inefficiency, local sugar ceases to be competitive. The outcome is paradoxical: since 2020, the preferential export quotas to the EU of about 37 thousand tonnes remain unused, while our neighbors, such as Ukraine, utilize them at about 100%. Moldova reports a utilization of 0% because of an absurd cost base.
Meanwhile, the industries that truly represent the brand “MADE IN MOLDOVA”— confectionery, ice cream, bakery products, preserves, specialty products— are growing, yet are forced to produce using artificially overpriced raw material. Yesterday on international exchanges, sugar was quoted at 345 euro/ton (6,9 lei/kg). In the Republic of Moldova, the wholesale price is 15–16 lei/kg, while the retail price exceeds 18 lei/kg. We pay twice the international benchmark, not for superior quality, but to subsidize an inefficient, costly, and uncompetitive system that protects itself and opposes any reform. Any increase in the sugar price directly reduces the competitiveness of our food exports, affecting thousands of employees in the real sector.
Q: It seems paradoxical: if the market is heavily protected, you would logically expect more efficiency…
A.L.: The real paradox is that protectionism has become the perfect alibi and excuse for stagnation. The sugar industry is one of the most “pampered” sectors: safeguard measures for over 12 years, massive 75% customs duties, large subsidies in 2025, and barriers to imports. In theory, protection buys time to modernize. In practice, we are seeing the steepest regional decline in sown area, the freezing of investment programs and the allocation of significant budgets sizeable to lobbying actions/protectionist.
The contrast of 2025 was shocking: a good harvest on small areas, yet one that industrial processors were unable to harvest. About 40% of last year’s crop is still in the fields, rotting under the snow. Moreover, cynically, sugar producers remain the largest importers. On the first day of 2026, 90% of the preferential import quota (EU 9,000 tonnes and WTO 1,000 tonnes) of 10,000 tonnes was taken up by Sudzucker Moldova and Moldova Zahăr. These decisions are inexplicable and fuel the anger of farmers who are still unpaid.
The dissonance between “protecting the sector” and monopolistic dominance of the market is evident.
Q: You said “hostage.” Who is holding whom hostage?
A.L.: The current model is built on pressure and blackmail, creating several hostages:
Consumer: who pays double for promises recycled endlessly.
Authorities: harassed with periodic threats about “closing the factories” and endless subsidy demands, using influence networks as pressure levers.
Farmers: who pay the bill first because campaigns are run unprofessionally.
European parent companies from Mannheim and Warsaw: which have to cover losses generated by uninspired local management and inflated administrative costs.
Q: You say the problem is also managerial. What exactly do you mean?
A.L.: Sugar is not about propaganda, aggressive lobbying, glossy offices, car fleets, and “outrageous” salaries. It is about measured performance and operational discipline. Regrettably, in recent years we have seen a style of “political management” in a sector that is “sunsetting.” They focus on bureaucratic approaches, delayed decisions, and administrative costs disproportionate to real economic performance.
Their business model relies on monopolizing the market through disinformating the authorities. Bringing into this game “international” associations or pocket unions, fully financially dependent on producers, compromises any dialogue. These satellites are merely lobby firms and factories of confusion, whose role is not to solve problems but to mislead the public. The slogan of “protecting the sector” has become a cover for a destructive monopoly, contrary to any European principle.
Q: Are there risks for factories that buy sugar on the domestic market?
A.L.: Absolutely, for context, over 30,000 people are employed in the food-processing industry. Producers of preserves and confectionery, ice cream and bakery products buy sugar at exorbitant and unjustified prices, while cheaper imports are restricted and “swallowed” by the same sugar producers to cover the black holes created by inefficiency. The result? Production costs rise sharply, which leads to bankruptcies or the relocation of businesses outside the country. If you pay double for sugar, your final product becomes uncompetitive, and the consumer will choose imported goods. Instead of “saving the industry,” we lose taxes and jobs in the sectors that truly have growth potential.
Q: The logic of high tariffs would be to protect local producers, including farmers…
A.L.: In reality, the taxes merely block cheaper sugar but do not address the real causes: poor maintenance, flawed management, and expensive logistics. Why should we pay taxes to protect an industry that does not deliver performance? For an ordinary person, this means “more expensive sugar in tea”. For the economy, it means fewer investments. A healthy economy is built on investment, not on barriers and propaganda. We are talking about postponing the inevitable, and the bill is cynically shared: the farmer loses first, the processor industrial next, and the consumer always pays.
Q: You mentioned “an 800 million lei bill.” Can you quantify it?
A.L.: Yes. The illusion of this sector costs us hundreds of millions every year. In 2025, my estimate includes:
50 million lei – direct support from the state (subsidies).
350 million lei/year – the hidden “protection fee” paid by consumers through the price gap versus the international market (70 thousand tonnes × 5,000 lei/tonne).
Approx. 400 million lei – direct losses, technical credits, and support provided by parent companies in Germany and Poland to cover the cost of inefficiency.
It is a bitter situation: the losses are managerial in nature. Financial discipline has been replaced by the expansion of the administrative apparatus and bonuses for “performance” in an industry that is sinking.
Q: How do you think things will develop going forward?
A.L.: My forecast is straightforward: international prices will remain low (330–360 €/t), and European prices will stay in the (400–440 €/t) corridor, which requires focusing on extremely efficient factories. Even Sudzucker AG in Germany has announced a reduction of areas by up to 35%. For us, poor organization of collection in 2025 was fatal. Farmers are discouraged. Even if propaganda announces figures above 10,000 ha, in reality only 5–7 thousand ha, insufficient for the factories to operate. Thus, we will likely be left with a single operating factory, whose owners will take radical managerial measures.
The year 2025, arguably the most favorable in the last 10 years, was compromised by poor organization of sugar beet collection. Shall we wait another 10 years?
The chances of recovery exist only if the European owners intervene firmly to ensure a drastic reduction of administrative and commercial expenses and redirect efforts toward efficiency, not lobbying. In any realistic scenario, Moldova remains dependent on cheaper imports. European integration will bring liberalization of foreign trade, forcing us to promote sectors that can grow without relying indefinitely on the “protection” the state grants to inefficient structures.
