Iran’s strategic victory: analysis of US

Make no mistake: the cease-fire agreement seals the strategic defeat of the U.S.-Israeli alliance in Iran. This war will go down in history as yet another episode of powerful countries falling into the trap of asymmetric warfare, in which even the strongest armies invariably fail to turn tactical successes into strategic victories.

The US and Israel – especially Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has a better grasp of history than US President Donald Trump – should have known this. The Principles of War laid out by Carl von Clausewitz in 1812 make it clear that the destruction of the enemy’s forces must have a decisive effect on his will to resist. Asymmetric warfare contradicts this “decisive battle” norm. And there was no reason to believe that Iran would be an exception.

A civilization galvanized by ideological fervor that had survived centuries of wars for survival would never surrender easily. A country that had sacrificed the lives of some 750 000 of its citizens , including thousands of children in the eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s has always had a huge advantage over enemies who collapse under the emotional impact of a few dozen body bags. A regime that in January killed tens of thousands of its own citizens in just 48 hours was not about to lose its temper two months later over threats against civilians.

The war against Iran had become a war against the world economy

Despite the fact that the U.S. and Israel have eliminated much of the Islamic Republic’s political and military leadership and destroyed much of its military capabilities, the regime is waging a grueling war against the world economy. As any competent military strategist would have predicted, Iran has blocked transit through the vital Strait of Hormuz and ensured that its Houthi allies are prepared to close the only alternative, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Add to this strategic drone and missile attacks, and Iran has largely succeeded in leveling the military advantage of its enemies.

At the same time, Iran has been able to supplement its budget: it now earns almost twice as much from oil sales as it does from oil sales. twice as much than it did before the war, while at the same time profiting from the fees it charges ships for passage through the strait. Russia has also benefited from the easing of U.S. sanctions on its oil. Meanwhile, revenues for U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf have plummeted which raises doubts about whether they can fulfill their promises to invest billions of dollars in the U.S. and in their own economic diversification.

To top it all off, the U.S. and Israel have not achieved any of their military objectives. Even the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz cannot be considered a victory since it was open before the war. Iran’s ballistic missile capability and its stockpile of enriched uranium remain a problem that will be resolved diplomatically, just as it was before the war. And the upcoming talks in Islamabad will not result in American diktat: the Iranians can still teach American negotiators a lesson, especially as Trump seeks to cut his losses and shift his attention to the politically vital domestic front and the neglected theater of war in East Asia.

As for regime change, although Iran is now run by different people, they are no more moderate than their predecessors. Quite the opposite: the Islamic Republic has become an outright military dictatorship, with the ayatollahs providing religious legitimacy to the hard-line Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Redrawing the Middle East

The broader regional implications are also not favorable to the U.S. and Israel. War will inevitably redraw the geopolitical map of the Middle East. The ties between the countries that most openly challenge the Western-led global order – China, Iran, Russia and North Korea – could be strengthened and their resolve strengthened.

At the same time, the Gulf states, which have borne the brunt of Iran’s retaliatory strikes, may begin to view U.S. military bases as a burden rather than an effective deterrent and begin to diversify their alliances. They might consider alliances with a regional power such as Turkey, which already has ties to the Gulf Cooperation Council, or with Pakistan, which has a defense pact with Saudi Arabia and has has demonstrated a willingness to share its nuclear know-how with Islamic states.

In fact, the likelihood of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East has now increased as leaders in Iran and elsewhere have come to view nuclear weapons as the ultimate insurance policy. Iran will also continue to strengthen its proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, using the collapse of states – and the West’s declining interest in nation-building – to bolster its regional buffers.

As for Israel, unless it holds Netanyahu accountable for leading the country into the abyss, its democracy is doomed. Through his brutal and ill-conceived policies, he has torn apart a once cohesive society and undermined Israel’s credibility in the U.S. to the point where alienating Americans is a strategic threat. His attempt to use Iran to deflect attention from Israel’s escalating brutality toward the Palestinians – which was vital to Netanyahu’s political survival – only compounds the disaster.

During the Cold War, the late American diplomat and strategist George Kennan recognized that internal dysfunction and external reassessment of power would lead to the Soviet Union’s self-destruction. He therefore developed a strategy of containment aimed at preventing Soviet expansion while avoiding unnecessary military confrontation.

The same strategy could have worked against the Islamic Republic, which would have collapsed sooner or later under the weight of its internal contradictions. Instead, the U.S. and Israel initiated a confrontation that would never have gone their way. And while the U.S. may be able to get over the shock of another defeat in an asymmetric war, Israel is not a superpower, no matter what Netanyahu claims.