Gulf states face tough choices amid US-Israel-Iran conflict

Hard choices for the Gulf countries

If there is a silver lining in this war, it is that by striking back so broadly, Iran has allayed fears that existing divisions among the Gulf states are worsening. In recent months, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have found themselves on opposite sides of armed conflicts in Sudan and southern Yemen. But now the Gulf states are united by anger at Iran for its aggression, frustration with the United States for ignoring its warnings, and confusion about what comes next.

Iran’s targeting of infrastructure and U.S. bases across the Persian Gulf reflects a deliberate strategy. Commentators on Iranian state television point out that Kuwait was a booming global center until 1991, but never fully regained that status after the Gulf War.

Thus, the Islamic Republic appears to realize that in order to force the U.S. back to the negotiating table, it is necessary not only to destabilize global energy markets but also to exploit the damage to the Persian Gulf’s reputation as a region of security and stability.

The six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC – Gulf cooperation council) have no good options. Too much diplomatic effort could anger a U.S. president determined to win outright. It could also legitimize a regime that has unceremoniously attacked the GCC on an unprecedented scale. Gulf states are increasingly frustrated by the loss of their ability to influence key events in their region.

The sheikhs do not want war

This frustration is fueling speculation that the UAE, Saudi Arabia or even Qatar may take offensive action against Iran, effectively going to war. Almost daily reports – often of Israeli origin and always quickly refuted – claim that such operations are already underway.

The UAE is at the center of such speculation. Having conducted a brilliant defensive operation against an extraordinary number of Iranian strikes, the UAE has reason to demonstrate its strength again by striking Iranian targets. However, Emirati leaders are cautious about assuming a belligerent role, given the risks.

Saudi Arabia has been subjected to fewer strikes and has tighter control over information. However, the Saudis have historically seen themselves as leaders within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and may look to assert that role. Ideally, any action they take would lead to a diplomatic settlement, but given the size and scope of the kingdom’s military capabilities, it is easy to see why the Israelis seem interested in their involvement.

It is also worth considering whether the war could reignite competition between the Gulf states. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are competing to become US President Donald Trump’s indispensable partner in the Gulf. If Trump demonstrates a strong interest in Gulf involvement in attacking Iran, one or more Gulf leaders may see this as an opportunity to strengthen their position vis-à-vis others. Once one Gulf country strikes Iran, it could create pressure on other countries to follow suit.

At the moment, the top priority for all Gulf states is to stop the Iranian strikes, resume transit routes, and restore energy production. However, these states are also well aware that if the Islamic Republic emerges from this conflict unscathed and unscathed, it will become bolder and likely seek nuclear weapons.

Given the seriousness of Iranian aggression, the UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular will only support a solution that significantly reduces the threat of further Iranian attacks. If diplomacy fails to achieve such an outcome, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states may, individually or collectively, consider other options.

Strategic patience

The most likely position of the Gulf states in the near term will be strategic patience – ironically, an approach that Iran itself has long favored. The UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular will be watching the war closely, looking, perhaps in vain, for signs that the U.S. and Israel have a credible strategy with achievable objectives.

If a decisive outcome is within reach, the UAE and perhaps Saudi Arabia may decide to join the effort by contributing air power or other resources at a time of relatively low risk, when the U.S.-Israel coalition is poised for victory. If the conflict begins to resemble a protracted quagmire, however, the Gulf states will turn to diplomatic mediation, working to create exits that the U.S. could accept without appearing to concede.

Strategic patience may be the wisest approach at this point. But the longer the war goes on, the more the GCC countries’ credibility as a stable global center is undermined. Still, if the GCC countries push the U.S. into diplomacy – in line with Iran’s own strategy of forcing the Gulf states to pressure the U.S. – it will set a dangerous precedent. The next time Iran wants something from the U.S., all it will have to do is attack the GCC to get it.

Of course, the GCC countries might consider a partial break from the US to take the target off their backs. In the past, they have tried to strengthen their ties with the US by seeking a partnership with China, which has vital interests in the Middle East and has hinted at a willingness to help resolve the current conflict. However, China’s primary objective of ensuring continued energy imports can be accomplished without major security investments or a geopolitical confrontation with the US. Its current strategy is working, and it is unlikely to change unless the regional order collapses completely.

Both a Gulf offensive and an agreement to end the war are unlikely in the near term. But in the absence of a clear U.S. strategy for the region, the Gulf states will seek to influence events more actively. One or more of these countries, acting together or independently, will eventually begin to assert their own vision of how the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran should end.