Viktor Orban
Reforms of the Hungarian political and legal systems are an obvious first step. But exactly how to accomplish this is far from clear. The structural problems of what observers now commonly refer to as “transition 2.0” are unprecedented, so the lessons of previous democratic transitions seem to be of little use.
In the 1970s and 1980s, relatively clear imperatives could be discerned from the “third wave” of democratization. Countries often conducted “transitions by agreement,” in which more or less all parties negotiated and adopted a new agreement – and usually an entirely new constitution regulating political competition and establishing the rule of law.
However, the old elites retained enough privileges to feel comfortable in the new system: the military usually received pay, and property relations generally remained unchanged. This allowed autocracy-seeking politicians such as Orban and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the longtime leader of Poland’s far-right Law and Justice (PiS) party, to later claim that the transition was a sham – arguments that could easily be used as weapons to consolidate their own power.
Moreover, in previous transitions, the old regime was officially denied. Even when such denial was hypocritical, it precluded permanent mobilization against the new regime. Today, however, populists often lose elections by small margins and have every reason to contest the results: they consider themselves representatives of half the population – which they often refer to as “real people” – in highly polarized countries. They have no incentive to depolarize their societies and demobilize their supporters because the source of populists’ power is sowing discord. This partly explains why they portray their political opponents as corrupt “elites” colluding with outside interests.
In this context, roundtable negotiations seem impractical and are never seriously considered. Instead, new pro-democracy governments discover the traps set by their far-right predecessors and face all sorts of veto-wielding players – problems that take away from their time in power. The stakes are high: the more ineffective they seem, the more likely it is that the populists will be able to capitalize on voter discontent in the next election. And if populists do return to power, they will bring with them new ideas on how to get back at their opponents. US President Donald Trump’s explicit promise of “retaliation” is only the most extreme example.
Polish example
Nowhere are these structural problems more pronounced than in Poland. After convincingly defeating the Law and Justice party in October 2023, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s coalition faced a judiciary that had been looted by Kaczynski’s allies and staffed by his loyalists, and a president associated with Law and Justice who relentlessly vetoed reforms. This created a dilemma: how could the new government restore the independence of the judiciary without using methods that do not meet EU rule of law standards?
According to political scientists Stanley Bill and Ben Stanley, reformers in Poland faced a trilemma: they needed to act legally and effectively, but also quickly. So far, however, they seem to have succeeded only in the first two points. And throughout this reconstruction process, business as usual politics continues, which means that disgruntled or impatient citizens may simply vote for populists again in protest. Last year, Law and Justice Party candidate Karol Nawrocki won the presidential election, continuing his tireless work to block Tusk’s initiatives.
The Polish experience holds three lessons for Hungary (assuming the opposition wins on Sunday). The first concerns external players. After the victory of Tusk’s coalition, the EU quickly unblocked funds frozen due to rule of law violations. This not only gave the impression that the bloc was encouraging politicians it liked – Tusk is a former president of the European Council – but also squandered an important source of influence. If the permanent veto players can be portrayed. as preventing the allocation of badly needed resources, it may create some internal pressure on the populists.
The second lesson is that intermediate options are not livable. Moderation may seem the best way to prevent accusations of hypocrisy from populist opposition forces. But they are likely to make such accusations against any pro-democracy government, even one that tries hard to make conciliatory gestures toward far-right populist parties (and their voters). This is especially true if far-right figures still control much of the media ecosystem, as is the case in Hungary.
When legality is harmful
This means that some institutions may need to be radically restructured, and parliaments may have to declare entire constitutions illegitimate. While outside observers such as the EU and the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s expert body on the rule of law, should not shy away from criticizing pro-democracy governments, they should be consistent. As Princeton sociologist Kim Lane Scheppele has noted, the Venice Commission was blinded by legality when, having rightly identified the mechanisms for appointing Polish judges as illegal, it criticized the Tusk government for wanting to remove some of these illegally appointed judges.
The final lesson may seem almost trivial, but it remains an important one: members of the elite must take responsibility for doing the right thing.
Consider the failed transition period after the first Trump administration. Many leaders, including Republicans, knew that Trump should never be president again. But many chose to shift responsibility, often driven by short-term personal or political calculations. Of course, it is unrealistic to expect politicians to be angels or even selfless champions of democracy. But removing populists from power opens up new possibilities: a political entrepreneur may see value in splitting such a coalition and bringing in more moderate members.
If Hungary’s elections pave the way for a democratic transition, the new government will face many structural challenges, as well as pressure from Orban’s influential supporters in Russia and the United States. But with the right support from external players and a willingness to act boldly, a future without the extreme right is possible.
Jan-Werner Müller
Jan-Werner Müller, professor of political science at Princeton University, is the author of The Rules of Democracy (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021).
© Project Syndicate, 2026.
www.project-syndicate.org
