The priority of economic and commercial interests is striking. The document talks about reducing U.S. trade imbalances, expanding trade, improving the security of production chains, and reindustrializing the country. Allies are considered allies only if they shoulder a much greater burden of defense spending. Geoeconomics is supplanting geopolitics. Investment yes, aid no. Fossil fuels and nuclear power, yes; solar, wind and other renewables, no (and climate change worries).
Biggest change: The Western Hemisphere, long ignored, has come to the center of U.S. national security policy. It tops the list of what the U.S. wants in and from the world; it is talked about at length and before all other regions.
This newfound priority should be understood as a consequence of the increased concern for domestic security in the U.S., as a continuation of the domestic fight against drug trafficking and illegal immigration. America’s military presence is changing accordingly. In other words, Trump’s “supplemental” now ranks alongside the “Monroe Doctrine” and “Theodore Roosevelt’s supplemental,” although this policy appears to stem from the idea of U.S. economic and strategic penetration of the rest of America and the exclusion of others from the region.
The Indo-Pacific has been the silver medalist in terms of attention. Not surprisingly, there is much emphasis on the economic aspects of the policy, “rebalancing America’s economic relationship with China, while prioritizing reciprocity and fairness for the sake of restoring U.S. economic independence.” But the strategy also states that preventing conflict over Taiwan is a priority.
North Korea is not mentioned at all. How the administration plans to balance its economic and strategic goals in that part of the world is unknown, which is why Trump’s planned visit to China next spring will be critical.
By contrast, in the Middle East, the administration wants to reduce America’s role, even though it has dominated its foreign policy for nearly 35 years. Whether this will prove possible remains to be seen, but it is safe to say that this strategy overstates what has been achieved in peacemaking and in weakening Iran. Africa (although it is the region where the greatest population growth is expected) has generally remained in the background.
Europe gets the harshest words. After describing the continent’s obvious economic problems, the document states that “this economic decline is overshadowed by the real and distinct prospect of the erasure of civilization.
The EU’s actions are portrayed as weakening freedom and sovereignty. The strategy states, “If current trends continue, this continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or even sooner. And so it is far from clear whether some European countries will have strong enough armies and economies to remain reliable allies.”
Curiously, the discussion of Europe ends on a slightly more positive note in this document: “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us compete successfully and to work in concert with us to prevent any adversaries from dominating Europe.” Yet the attitude toward Europe is generally negative, patronizing and threatening.
Russia got off easy. It is not seen as an adversary. The demand for peace in Ukraine is unequivocal. Russian President Vladimir Putin can take comfort in the stated goal of restoring “strategic stability in relations with Russia” and declarations about NATO, namely that it is time to end “the perception of NATO as an ever-expanding alliance (and to prevent this from happening in reality).”
One could be forgiven for perceiving this strategy document as an implicit recognition of the idea of spheres of influence. The U.S. will play a leading role in the Western Hemisphere, Russia and the EU will settle things in Europe on their own, and China will gain more influence over the future of Asia, provided it doesn’t go too far. The document explicitly states, “The enormous influence of larger, richer and stronger countries is an eternal truth of international relations.”
This strategy is not isolationist, but it does present a narrower, clamped-down view of America’s interests and degree of involvement: ‘The days of the US maintaining the entire world order like Atlanta are over’. The document also demonstrates unilateralism and a strong bias against international organizations, which are often portrayed as necessarily anti-American and compromising national sovereignty.
The new foreign policy doesn’t just ignore morality, it is fundamentally immoral. Europe aside, it is a policy that does not tolerate interference in the internal affairs of other countries: “We seek good relations, including peaceful commercial relations, with countries of the world without imposing on them democratic or other social changes that are very different from their traditions and history.”
This hyper-realism is emphasized in the section encouraging cooperation with Middle Eastern authorities: “This will require abandoning America’s misguided experiment of forcing these countries (especially the Gulf monarchies) to abandon traditions and historical forms of government.”
What conclusion follows from all this? The era when America was the anchor of alliances and international organizations, championed democracy and human rights, and was willing to make sacrifices for the rule of law and the balance of power around the world is over. It has been replaced by a world in which U.S. actions are driven more by direct benefits to America’s economy, individual companies, and national security.
The next president may well change elements of this approach to the world (most notably the focus on the Americas), but in the meantime the likely result is a more disorderly, less free and less prosperous world, in no small part because this administration will be in office for another three years. For Russia and China, there are opportunities here, while traditional friends and allies in Europe and Asia will face increased risks and difficult choices. There is only one certainty: one historical era is ending and another is beginning.
Richard Haass,
President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Advisor to Centerview Partners.
at Centerview Partners, Distinguished Scholar at New York University,
author of the weekly Home & Away substack newsletter .
© Project Syndicate, 2025.
www.project-syndicate.org
